






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																												
Would	the	public	have	confidence	in	the	decisions	of	such	a	tribunal?’	(Quoted	in	Nobles	and	Schiff,	n	8	above,	
47)	
129	For	example,	by	reinforcing	the	penalty	used	to	curb	applications	for	leave	to	appeal	or	appeals,	where	
some	or	all	of	the	time	spent	in	prison	waiting	for	the	appeal	to	be	decided	does	not	to	count	towards	the	
sentence	served	(loss	of	time	directions	–	Criminal	Procedure	Rules	2011,	The	Consolidated	Criminal	Practice	
Direction,	Part	II.16).	The	criticism	is	that,	ceteris	parabus,	this	deters	the	innocent	but	risk	averse	individual	
more	than	the	risk	prone	but	guilty	one.		
130	A	doctrine	that	many	commentators	and	practitioners	have	questioned	or,	at	least,	questioned	in	terms	of	
its	continuing	significance.	The	usual	suggestion	is	that	‘lurking	doubt’	implies	other	specific	grounds	of	appeal,	
and	it	would	be	more	acceptable,	especially	from	the	point	of	view	of	articulating	clear	precedents,	to	identify	
what	those	specific	grounds	are.	See,	for	example,	the	practitioner	text	by	P.	Taylor,	Taylor	on	Criminal	Appeals	
(2nd	edn.,	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2012)	119-121.	
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provides	no	reasons	for	its	decisions,	which	leads	to	appeals	which	focus	on	the	decisions	made	by	
the	judge	at	trial,	especially	her/his	summing	up	to	the	jury.	Having	no	way	of	knowing	how	the	jury	
did	reach	its	decision,	leads	to	a	system	of	appeals	organised	around	how	the	jury	could	justifiably	
have	reached	its	decision.	This	has	the	effect	of	severely	restricting	the	relevance	of	procedural	
errors	or	new	evidence.	The	jury	are	treated	as	a	fact	finding	body,	who	are	assumed	to	have	
followed	the	judge’s	instructions,	and	to	have	found	as	true	all	of	the	facts	identified	by	that	
summing	up	as	necessary	for	the	conviction.	Adopting	this	perspective,	the	appeal	court	judges	
effectively	ask	themselves	if	the	new	evidence,	or	the	breach	of	procedure,	could	have	made	a	
difference	to	the	verdict	of	this	jury.	Whilst	the	standard	of	‘possible	difference’	suggests	a	liberal	
approach	to	appeals,	given	its	semantic	distance	from	the	trial	standard	of	proof	beyond	reasonable	
doubt,	adopting	what	normally	amounts	to	the	prosecution	case	as	fact,	leads	to	a	situation	that	can	
reasonably	be	described	as	a	‘reverse	burden	of	proof.’131	
	
Further	restrictions	on	appeals	arise	from	the	Court’s	approach	to	new	evidence.132	There	will	often	
be	some	evidence	or	arguments	that	a	jury	did	not	hear	that,	with	hindsight,	might,	if	heard,	have	
led	to	a	different	decision.	This	is	not	least	because	both	prosecution	and	defence	commonly	seek	to	
offer	alternative	narratives,	and	choose	not	to	introduce	evidence	that	weakens	the	chosen	
narrative.	Allowing	appeals	based	on	these	excluded	alternatives,	even	if	it	were	to	be	examined	on	
the	basis	that	the	prosecution	case	had	been	accepted	as	factually	correct,	would	open	the	Court	to	
an	enormous	increase	in	the	number	of	appeals.	These	are	primarily	screened	out	by	attributing	
agency	to	defendants.	Their	lawyers’	choices	are	attributed	to	them.	Having	made	these	choices,	
																																								 																				
131	Although	this	can	be	shown	to	apply	more	generally,	we	have	previously	specifically	described	how	and	why	
this	may	operate	in	relation	to	the	reassessment	of	scientific	evidence	on	appeal:	Nobles	and	Schiff,	n	8	above,	
199-215.	
132	Technically,	this	is	now	governed	by	section	23	of	the	Criminal	Appeasl	Act	1968	(as	amended	by	the	
Criminal	Appeal	Act	1995).	For	analysis,	see	Taylor	on	Appeals,	n	130	above,	174-191.		
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they	cannot	now	ask	for	a	consideration	of	arguments	and	evidence	that	could,	but	were	not,	made	
at	trial.	Of	course	this	focusses	attention	on	the	standard	of	the	advice	and	representation	enjoyed	
by	defendants.	If	the	agency	attributed	to	the	defendant	were	reliant	on	the	very	highest	standards	
of	professional	competence	and	the	resources	that	facilitate	such	competence,	then	the	reduction	in	
appeals	achieved	by	the	Court’s	interpretation	of	new	evidence	would	be	much	less.	Instead,	we	find	
a	reluctance	to	hear	arguments	or	evidence	that	were	available	but	not	made	at	trial	unless	the	legal	
assistance	given	could	be	shown	to	be	an	example	of	‘flagrant	incompetence’:		
	
This	is	an	unpromising	ground	of	appeal,	the	court	is	extremely	reluctant	to	accede,	and	in	
the	interests	of	the	appellant	D	it	must	be	hoped	that	there	are	other	more	promising	
grounds	of	appeal.	It	is	not	enough	that	counsel	was	inept,	he	made	a	mistake,	he	was	under	
a	misapprehension,	he	made	a	tactical	error,	his	judgment	was	flawed,	he	was	unwise,	
another	counsel	might	have	conducted	the	case	differently,	or	better.133	
 
The	practice	of	restricting	what	constitutes	new	evidence,	refusing	to	undertake	a	rehearing	of	trial	
evidence,	and	the	committment	shown	to	the	presumed	construction	placed	upon	the	evidence	by	
the	particular	jury	have	been	subjected	to	sustainted	criticism	in	the	media,	most	notably	in	the	
aftermath	of	the	drawn	out	failure	in	the	UK	of	the	Court	of	Appeal	to	quash	the	convictions	of	high	
profile	prisoners	convicted	of	terrorist	related	offences	in	the	early	1970s:	the	Birmingham	6,	
Guildford	4,	Maguire	7	and	Judith	Ward	cases.134	The	deference	shown	to	the	jury	by	appeal	court	
judges	was	also	noted	and	criticised	in	the	Report	of	the	Runciman	Royal	Commission	on	Criminal	
Justice	set	up	after	the	successful	third	appeal	of	the	Birmingham	6:		
	
																																								 																				
133	A.	Samuels,	‘The	incompetence	of	counsel	as	a	ground	of	appeal’	Criminal	Lawyer	(2013)	3.		
134	See	our	analysis	of	this	media	reporting:	Nobles	and	Schiff,	n	8	above,	chapter	4.	
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In	its	approach	to	the	consideration	of	appeals	against	conviction,	the	Court	of	Appeal	seems	
to	us	to	have	been	too	heavily	influenced	by	the	role	of	the	jury	in	Crown	Court	trials.	Ever	
since	1907,	commentators	have	detected	a	reluctance	on	the	part	of	the	Court	of	Appeal	to	
consider	whether	a	jury	has	reached	a	wrong	decision	…	the	court	should	be	more	willing	to	
consider	arguments	that	indicate	that	a	jury	might	have	made	a	mistake	…	[and]	more	
prepared,	where	appropriate,	to	admit	evidence	that	might	favour	the	defendant’s	case	
even	if	it	was,	or	could	have	been,	available	at	the	trial.135	
	
In	presenting	these	observations	on	the	level	of	deference	shown	to	the	jury,	we	are	not	asserting	
that	appeal	court	judges	never	lower	their	standard	of	respect	for	jury	verdicts.	Indeed,	the	example	
of	R	v	B	shows	the	contrary.	Rather,	one	has	to	consider	the	possibilities	for	adjusting	deference	in	
terms	of	the	role	played	by	the	jury	in	establishing	the	truth	of	what	cannot	be	known	with	certainty.	
There	was	no	suggestion,	at	least	from	the	Runciman	Royal	Commission,	that	the	appeal	courts	
should	abandon	deference	towards	jury	verdicts,	and	open	themselves	to	the	possibility	of	having	to	
re-examine	every	guilty	verdict	for	possible	error	based	on	their	own	judgment	of	the	facts.136	Nor	
																																								 																				
135	Royal	Commission	on	Criminal	Justice	Report	(1993)	Cm	2263,	ch.10,	para.3.	For	a	discussion	of	the	
persistence	of	this	deference	in	the	face	of	changing	statutory	formulations	of	the	appeal	provisions,	see	D.	
Schiff	and	R.	Nobles,	‘Criminal	Appeal	Act	1995:	The	Semantics	of	Jurisdiction’	(1996)	59	The	Modern	Law	
Review	573,	and	on	the	necessity	for	deference,	Nobles	and	Schiff,	n	123	above.	
136	In	a	case	like	R	v	B,	where	there	is	neither	new	evidence	nor	an	error	of	procedure,	the	general	position	has	
to	be	that	outlined	by	Lord	Woolf	–	it	has	to	be	accepted,	amongst	all	judges	in	the	Court	of	Appeal,	and	all	
those	who	direct	cases	up	to	them	(judges	giving	leave	and	counsel	advising	on	appeals,	and	even	the	Criminal	
Cases	Review	Ciommission	in	making	a	post-appeal	reference)	that	there	is	a	considerable	unwillingness	to	
overturn	the	jury’s	verdict.	That	is	why	R	v	B	is	both	an	example	of	the	fact	that	this	could	occur,	and	a	general	
reminder	to	judges	and	counsel	that	this	cannot	be	anything	other	than	a	quite	exceptional	reason	for	an	
appeal	succeeding.	
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any	suggestion	that	they	should	convert	a	system	of	appeal	by	review	into	one	involving	a	full	
rehearing,	which	might	give	more	plausibility	to	their	decisions	to	quash	jury	verdicts.	The	
assumption	underlying	the	Royal	Commission’s	criticism	is	that	the	jury	is	still	the	body	entrusted	
with	solving	this	problem	(namely	conviction	without	certainty)	but	that,	nevertheless,	on	more	
frequent	occasions	than	have	occurred	previously,	the	Court	of	Appeal	must	be	willing	to	take	on	
this	task	itself.	But	it	is	unclear	how	the	Court	can	do	this	whilst	still	treating	the	jury	as	a	body	which	
can	establish	the	truth	of	whether	a	person	is	guilty.	If	the	jury	is	regarded	as	having	found	the	facts,	
by	accepting	the	evidence	necessary	for	there	to	be	a	conviction,	this	will	always	restrict	the	
possibilities	for	a	successful	appeal.	As	such,	the	instruction	to	show	‘less	deference’	is	a	call	for	the	
appeal	judges	to	operate	somewhere	between	these	positions,	without	any	clear	sense	of	what	this	
might	entail,	how	it	could	be	operated	consistently,	nor	how	the	task	is	to	be	communicated	
between	the	various	judges	who	staff	the	Court	of	Appeal,	both	now	and	over	time,	or	the	judges	
who	award	leave	to	appeal,	or	the	Criminal	Cases	Review	Commission	in	their	decisions	to	refer	
cases	in	anticipation	of	what	may	amount	to	a	successful	appeal.137	
	
There	can,	of	course,	be	adjustments	of	doctrine	which	will	alter	what	can	result	in	an	appeal.	The	
standard	of	professional	incompetence	can	be	changed,	and	new	evidence	can	be	defined	with	
reference	to	the	practical	difficulties	of	obtaining	evidence	in	time	for	trial,	rather	than	whether	it	
was	available	at	time	of	trial	and,	in	theory,	could	have	been	obtained	and	called.	And	such	changes	
will	lead	to	increased	numbers	of	appeals.	But	if	these	appeals	are	not	to	undo	the	current	solution	
to	the	functional	need	that	we	have	outlined	throughout	this	article,	and	begin	an	evolution	towards	
																																								 																				
137	The	Criminal	Cases	Review	Commission,	set	up	by	the	Criminal	Appeal	Act	1995,	may	refer	cases	to	the	
Court	of	Appeal	where	there	is	a	‘real	possibility’	of	a	successful	appeal	(s.13.1.a).	We	explore	a	number	of	the	
complications	of	the	reltaionship	between	these	different	bodies	involved	with	considering	misacrriages	of	
justice	in	the	UK,	in	R.	Nobles	and	D.	Schiff,	‘The	Criminal	Cases	Review	Commission:	Establishing	a	Workable	
Relationship	with	the	Court	of	Appeal’	[2005]	Criminal	law	Review	173.	
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a	new	one,	then	they	must	continue	to	be	decided	in	terms	of	an	acceptance	that	the	jury	are	a	fact	
finding	body,	whose	finding	of	facts	must	form	the	basis	of	any	reassessment	of	the	conviction.	And,	
with	this	approach,	accusations	of	‘excessive’	deference	from	the	academic	and	media	critics	alluded	
to	by	the	Royal	Commission,	are	likely	to	continue.	
	
Lastly,	in	this	brief	review	of	modern	UK	practice,	we	need	to	consider	how	the	appeal	process	
relates	to	one	of	the	central	features	of	the	modern	procedure	for	conviction	–	the	guilty	plea.	This	
practice	was	justified	in	the	Courts,	even	as	late	as	the	1990s,	on	the	basis	that	those	who	show	
contrition	for	their	crimes,	by	admitting	them,	should	be	rewarded	by	receiving	a	lower	sentence	
than	those	who	do	not.	This	rationale,	however	unconvincing,	justifies	the	reliance	on	the	guilty	plea	
on	the	basis	that	it	represents	evidence	(via	self-expression)	of	guilt.	The	more	recent	changes	to	the	
English	criminal	justice	system	adopt	a	self-consiously	managerial	approach	to	the	practice	–	
justifying	the	reduction	of	sentences	by	reference	to	the	resources	being	saved	by	those	who	do	not	
insist	on	their	right	to	jury	trial	and	plead	guilty	early,	with	sentences	normally	adjusted	upwards	by	
reference	to	a	tariff	the	later	the	guilty	plea	occurs	within	the	process.138	Rewarding	defendants	for	
forgoing	jury	trial	quite	obviously	puts	pressure	on	those	who	cannot	afford	trial	in	terms	of	the	
defence	costs,	or	who	prioritise	sentence	reduction	over	the	benefits	of	acquittal.	And	
																																								 																				
138	S.114	Criminal	Justice	Act	2003.	The	sentencing	guidelines	make	it	clear	that	the	strength	of	a	defendant’s	
case	(and	the	likelihood	of	being	innocent)	is	not	a	relevant	consideration	for	the	court,	when	offering	an	
incentive	to	plead	guilty.	The	issue	to	be	considered	by	the	court	is	how	much	an	early	plea	has	saved	in	
economic	and	emotional	(for	the	victim	and	witnesses)	costs.	See	Sentencing	Council	Guidelines	‘Reduction	in	
Sentence	for	a	Guilty	Plea:	Definitive	Guide,	revised	2007,	statement	of	purpose,	para	2.2.	McConville	and	
Marsh	(n	83	above,	225,	n	32)	claim	that	the	courts	commonly	object	to	providing	this	discount	to	persons	
where	the	case	against	them	is	overwhelming.	They	do	not	however	object	to	the	likelihood	that	those	who	
have	a	less	then	overwhelming	case	against	them	(they	might	be	innocent)	will	be	incentivised	to	plead	guilty	
at	an	early	stage.	
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acknowledging	that	the	justification	for	this	is	not	contrition,	but	simply	resources	saved,	
undermines	any	claim	that	a	guilty	plea,	like	a	confession,	represents	evidence	of	guilt.	
	
In	light	of	the	obvious	dangers	of	incentivising	defendants	to	plead	guilty,	how	ready	is	the	English	
legal	system	to	allow	appeals	from	prisoners	who	decide	later	to	assert	their	innocence?	As	with	the	
jury	verdict,	the	evidence	and	advice	available	to	the	defendant	could	always	have	been	different.	
Evidence	which	could	have	been	disclosed	may	not	have	been,	and	evidence	not	available	may	
subsequently	become	available.	Counsel	or	solicitors	may	have	taken	greater	care	to	interrogate	the	
prosecution	case,	or	have	exercised	better	judgment.139	But	allowing	these	factors	to	undo	a	
conviction	has,	within	a	system	with	its	considerable	reliance	on	the	guilty	plea,	as	much	or	even	
more	capacity	to	undo	the	solution	to	the	functional	need	described	throughout	this	article	than	a	
greater	openness	to	quashing	jury	verdicts.	Prior	to	the	current	UK	reforms	the	illusion,	that	pleas	
could	be	relied	upon	provided	that	they	were	made	without	pressure	or	coercion,	was	maintained	
by	the	fiction	that	such	pressure	did	not	arise	so	long	as	the	judge	took	no	active	part	in	articulating	
the	reductions	likely	to	follow	a	guilty	plea.140	But	the	new	system	of	statutory	tariff	reductions	
creates	a	similar	level	of	certainty,	and	pressure,	to	that	of	a	judge	spelling	out	the	terms	of	the	
reduced	sentence	that	will	follow	from	a	guilty	plea.	The	standard	is	that	the	guilty	plea	must	be	a	
‘true	acknowledgement	of	guilt’.	This	sounds	liberal,	until	one	understands	that	it	operates	on	the	
basis	that	all	guilty	pleas	entered	under	routine	circumstances	are	to	be	treated	as	meeting	this	
																																								 																				
139	M.	McConville,	J.	Hodgson,	L.	Bridges,	A.	Pavlovic,	Standing	Accused:	The	Organization	and	Practices	of	
Criminal	Defence	Lawyers	in	Britain	(Clarendon	Press	1994);	D.	Newman,	Legal	Aid	Lawyers	and	the	Quest	for	
Justice	(Oxford:	Hart	Publishing,	2013):	both	of	these	studies	report	negative	assessments	of	the	quality	of	
advice	and	representation	provided	to	their	clients	by	criminal	solicitors.	Newman	(at	165)	found	a	rhetorical	
commitment	to	provide	a	good	service	and	facilitate	justice	amongst	the	lawyers	working	within	both	‘radical’	
and	‘sausage	factory’	legal	practices,	and	a	common	failure	to	live	up	to	this	rhetoric	within	both.	
140		Classically	articulated	in	R	v	Turner	(1970)	54	Cr.	App.	R.	352.	
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standard.	One	finds	examples	of	successful	appeals,	but	only	in	cases	where	there	is	evidence	that,	
at	the	time	of	the	plea,	the	defendant	suffered	from	rather	more	than	the	‘normal’	pressure	to	plead	
guilty.	And	as	noted	by	McConville	and	Marsh,	there	is	something	approaching	a	wilful	refusal	by	the	
judiciary	to	acknowledge	the	obvious	probability	that	a	considerable	number	of	guilty	pleas	will	be	
made	by	innocent	defendants.	
	
[O]nce	he	has	admitted	such	facts	by	an	unambiguous	and	deliberately	intended	plea	of	guilty,	there	
cannot	then	be	an	appeal	against	his	conviction,	for	the	simple	reason	that	there	is	nothing	unsafe	
about	a	conviction	based	on	the	defendant’s	own	voluntary	confession	in	open	court.	A	defendant	
will	not	normally	be	permitted	in	this	court	to	say	that	he	has	changed	his	mind	and	now	wishes	to	
deny	what	he	has	previously	thus	admitted	in	the	Crown	Court.141	
	
Instead,	the	discussion	typically	proceeds	on	the	basis	that	discounts	operate	only	to	persuade	the	
guilty	to	give	up	the	possibility	of	securing	an	acquittal.142	The	possibility	that	the	innocent	may	
																																								 																				
141	R	v	Asiedu	[2015]	EWCA	Crim	714,	para	19.	In	this	case	it	was	held	that	irregularities	at	trial,	such	as	non-
disclosure	of	evidence	that	favoured	the	defence,	would	not	allow	a	defendant	to	appeal	successfully	after	a	
guilty	plea	unless	those	irregularities	amounted	to	the	legally	defined	and	‘closely	confined’	notion	of	an	abuse	
of	process.	
142	This,	we	would	argue,	is	demonstrably	the	approach	adopted	throughout	the	latest	significant	official	
report	seting	out	detailed,	comprehensive	proposals	in	relation	to	the	UK	criminal	justice	system:	
“streamlining	all	their	processes,	increasing	their	efficiency	and	strengthening	the	effectiveness	of	their	
relationships	…	”.	A	review	of	the	Criminal	Courts	of	England	and	Wales	by	The	Right	Honourable	Lord	Justice	
Auld,	September	2001:	
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.criminal-courts-review.org.uk	
See:	for	trenchant	criticism	especially	as	regards	sentencing	discounts,	McConville	and	Marsh,	n	83	above,	ch	4	
‘Lowering	the	Bar’;	for	the	fuller	context,	Ashworth	and	Redmayne,	n	82	above,	ch	10	‘Plea’.	
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plead	guilty	is	either	ignored,	or	discounted	on	the	basis	that	this	will	in	some	sense	be	the	innocent	
defendant’s	own	fault:	
	
There	are	no	doubt	many	defendants	who,	although	they	know	they	are	guilty	of	the	offence	
alleged	against	them,	nevertheless	enter	a	plea	of	not	guilty	in	the	hope	of	being	acquitted.	
The	Bar	Council's	Code	of	Conduct	makes	clear	that	defence	counsel	should	explain	to	the	
accused	the	advantages	and	disadvantages	of	a	guilty	plea.	It	goes	on	that	he	must	make	it	
clear	that	the	client	has	complete	freedom	of	choice	and	that	the	responsibility	for	the	plea	
is	that	of	the	accused.	It	is	common	practice,	endorsed	by	paragraph	12.5.1,	to	tell	an	
accused	that	he	should	plead	guilty	only	if	he	is	guilty.143	(our	emphasis)	
	
Assessing	the	Present	
	
In	light	of	this	brief	history,	how	should	we	describe	the	current	situation?	Should	we	understand	
the	rights	granted	to	defendants	as	protections	against	wrongful	convictions	or,	in	addition,	as	
compensations	for	the	necessity	to	produce	‘sufficient’	convictions	in	circumstances	in	which	we	
cannot	be	absolutely	certain	as	to	the	guilt	of	accused	persons?	Is	our	present	form	of	adversarial	
trial	(as	we	have	described	it	in	the	UK	or,	we	would	argue,	other	forms	of	trial	in	other	jurisdictions),	
with	its	various	rights	and	procedures,	a	current	expression	of	the	continuing	need	to	overcome	a	
deficit	in	our	ability	to	be	certain	about	the	truth	of	accusations	that	particular	individuals	are	guilty	
of	particular	crimes?	And	if	it	is,	does	this	make	miscarriages	of	justice	not	simply	a	problem	in	
themselves	(a	moral	wrong,	with	many	highly	reprehensible	and	unacceptable	consequences),	but	
the	inevitable	outcome	of	a	solution	to	a	prior	problématique	and,	in	this	sense,	themselves	part	of	
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the	solution	to	that	problématique?	And	how	does	our	understanding	of	our	present	situation	alter	
if	we	accept	this	kind	of	analysis?	
	
Let	us	recap	on	the	historical	evidence.	Our	earliest	procedures	can	be	understood	in	these	terms.	
The	oath,	the	ordeal,	trial	by	combat	and	the	continental	system	of	trial	by	torture	were	expressly	
reserved	for	cases	where	the	clearest	proof	of	an	offender’s	guilt	was	not	available.	These	legal	
procedures	compensated	for	the	lack	of	evidence,	and	created	expectations,	in	communities,	that	
legal	redress	could	be	forthcoming	in	situations	where	accusers	had	less	than	the	clearest	evidence	
of	guilt.	It	is	not	hard	to	redescribe	these	forms	of	trial	in	functionalist	terms	as	mechanisms	which	
solved	the	problématique	of	the	need	to	punish	more	persons	than	could	be	demonstrated,	clearly,	
to	be	guilty	of	crimes	(assuming	of	course	that	those	crimes	had	been	committed	and	that,	
therefore,	someone	was	‘guilty’).	When	we	move	on	to	consider	the	jury,	the	situation	becomes	
more	difficult.	Because	we	continue	to	use	the	jury	in	Anglo-American	criminal	trials,	we	are	less	
willing	to	describe	it	in	these	terms	and,	correspondingly,	more	willing	to	describe	proven	
miscarriages	as	evidence	of	failure	in	themselves	–	whether	of	the	fallibility	of	reliance	on	trial	by	lay	
persons,	or	of	other	deficiencies	(rather	than	seeing	miscarriages	as	the	solution	to	a	prior	
problématique).	
	
It	is	clear	that	the	jury	has	its	origin	in	the	same	functionalist	needs	that	justified	the	ordeal,	as	its	
introduction	was	expressly	to	take	over	the	role	formerly	accomplisheded	by	the	ordeal.	This	was	
not	the	result	of	any	faith	that	juries	would	do	a	better	job	of	finding	the	truth	than	the	ordeal.	We	
can	suppose	that	the	local	jury	that	took	over	the	function	of	the	ordeal	at	least	had	some	local	
knowledge	of	the	crime,	and	we	can	also	suppose	that	the	later	selection	of	jurors	who	would	have	
no	such	local	knowledge	would	be	more	impartial	in	their	response	to	evidence	than	the	kind	of	jury	
they	replaced.	But	neither	of	these	two	changes	in	the	history	of	juries	was	a	response	to	any	
perception	that	the	prior	system	was	failing	to	identify	the	factually	guilty.	Both	changes	were	the	
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result	of	the	need	to	continue	to	process	persons	accused	of	crime	–	not	a	vague	and	general	social	
need,	but	the	immediate	pressure	of	persons	being	accused	and	detained	in	ever	increasing	
numbers	should	the	assizes	fail	to	reach	decisions	on	their	guilt	or	innocence.	With	the	18th	century	
jury	we	see	a	system	which	failed	to	meet	current	standards	for	the	evidence	necessary	to	justify	
capital	punishments,	but	which	was	generally	regarded	by	those	responsible	for	its	operation	as	an	
appropriate	mechanism	for	getting	at	the	truth	of	an	accusation.	However,	the	system	of	rewards	
that	undermined	contemporary	confidence	in	the	bona	fides	of	acccusers	was	allowed	to	continue	
for	50	years	after	the	starkest	possible	evidence	of	its	corrupting	tendencies.	The	fear	that	there	
would	be	insufficient	prosecutions	(and	convictions)	was	given	greater	priority	than	the	fear	of	
miscarriages	of	justice.	Until	the	creation	of	a	professional	police	force,	this	concern	with	the	
possibilities	of	corrupt	prosecutions	could	only	be	dealt	with	via	an	increased	burden	on	the	jury	to	
separate	the	false	but	corrupt	witness	from	the	truthful	but	corrupt	witness	(aided	by	warnings	from	
judges	on	the	need	for	corroboration	and	the	increased	use	of	lawyers	to	challenge	and	question	
witnesses).	
	
The	solution	to	the	predicament	of	the	corruption	produced	by	a	system	of	bounty	hunting	–	a	
professional	police	force	capable	of	investigating	crimes	-	has	produced	its	own	further	difficulties.	
Aside	from	new	forms	of	corruption	(the	pressure	on	police	to	justify	their	existence	by	‘solving’	
crime	–	as	evidenced	by	successful	prosecutions)	developments	in	policing	also	operate	to	increase	
the	complexity	of	the	evidence	presented	to	a	jury.	We	may	question	the	accuracy	of	jury	verdicts	
reached	in	minutes	by	18th	century	juries,	but	these	juries	had	to	consider	very	limited	evidence.		
Today’s	jury	has	to	consider	the	results	of	today’s	forms	of	police	investigation:	forensic	evidence,	
CCTV,	telecommunications	interception,	identification	and	confessions.	In	addition,	the	judicial	
reaction	to	dangers	represented	by	professional	informers	saw	the	beginnings	of	a	process	that	
remains	with	us:	the	juridification	of	trial	procedure.	These	procedures	are	organized	in	terms	of	the	
respective	rights	of	the	prosecution	and	defence:	to	question	witnesses,	have	disclosure,	notice	of	
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the	other’s	‘case’,	challenge	the	jury’s	membership,	etc.	Our	current	situation	is	therefore	one	which	
cannot	be	described	as	a	single-minded	pursuit	of	the	factual	truth	of	a	defendant’s	guilt.	Alongside	
the	pursuit	of	truth,	we	also	have	a	strong,	or	system	constructed,	concern	with	rights.	This	prompts	
the	continuing	question,	the	problématique:	whether	this	extra	element	is,	like	the	oath,	the	ordeal,	
trial	by	combat,	torture,	the	local	jury,	and	the	short	18th	century	trial	with	its	reliance	on	the	
defendant’s	character	and	demeanour,	a	modern	(and	in	many	ways	equivalent)	means	to	enable	
the	conviction	of	persons	in	the	absence	of	certainties	as	to	their	guilt.	
	
Our	modern	criminal	processes	undergo	considerable	changes,	or	at	least	what	is	suggested	to	be	
considerable	changes,	on	a	regular	basis,	and	often	in	response	to	the	symbolic	importance	of	the	
unacceptability	of	miscarriages	of	justice.	But,	at	this	particular	juncture,	in	the	still	early	stages	of	
the	21st	century,	with	the	development	of	new	forms	of	forensic	evidence	posing	different	
challenges,	and	the	development	of	plea	bargaining	and	the	guilty	plea	as	a	modern	equivalent	of	
the	need	for	conviction	in	the	absence	of	absolute	proof,	we	can	expect	miscarriages	of	justice	to	
remain	with	us.	Their	background	problématique	is	a	part	of	the	criminal	justice	system	–	an	
outcome	of	its	operations.	Of	course,	that	does	not	mean	that	every	effort	should	not	be	made	to	
reduce	their	numbers,	or	guard	against	their	occurrence.	But,	as	they	are	an	intrinsic	side-effect	of	
the	system’s	operation,	they	need	to	be	approached	with	a	less	naïve	assumption	that	they	merely	
reflect	human	failures	(whether	those	of	individuals	or	the	systems	which	they	construct).	They,	in	
practice,	reflect	the	operation	of	the	system,	as	much	as	the	punishment	of	those	actually	guilty	of	
the	crimes	with	which	they	have	been	charged	and	convicted.		
